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Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more risk averse when they per-
ceive risk that is gradually resolved over time. We address these ￿ndings by studying
a decision maker (DM) who has recursive, non-expected utility preferences over com-
pound lotteries. DM has preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty (PORU) if
he always prefers any compound lottery to be resolved in a single stage. We estab-
lish an equivalence between dynamic PORU and static preferences that are identi￿ed
with commonly observed behavior in Allais-type experiments. The implications of this
equivalence on preferences over information systems are examined. We de￿ne the grad-
ual resolution premium and demonstrate its magnifying e⁄ect when combined with the
usual risk premium. In an intertemporal context, PORU captures ￿loss aversion with
narrow framing￿ .
Keywords: Recursive preferences over compound lotteries, resolution of uncertainty,
Allais paradox, narrow framing, negative certainty independence.
1. Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more risk averse when they perceive
risk that is gradually resolved over time. In an experiment with college students, Gneezy
and Potters [1997] found that subjects invest less in risky assets if they evaluate ￿nancial
outcomes more frequently. Haigh and List [2005] replicated the study of Gneezy and Potters
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1with professional traders and found an even stronger e⁄ect. These two studies allow for
￿ exibility in adjusting investment according to how often the subjects evaluate the returns.
Bellemare, Krause, Kr￿ger, and Zhang [2005] found that even when all subjects have the
same investment ￿ exibility, variations in the frequency of information feedback alone a⁄ects
investment behavior systematically. All their subjects had to commit in advance to a ￿xed
equal amount of investment for three subsequent periods. Group A was told that they would
get periodic statements (i.e. would be informed about the outcome of the gamble after every
draw), whereas group B knew that they would hear only the ￿nal yields of their investment.
The average investment in group A was signi￿cantly lower than in group B. The authors
conclude that ￿information feedback should be the variable of interest for researchers and
actors in ￿nancial markets alike.￿Such interdependence between the way individuals observe
the resolution of uncertainty and the amount of risk they are willing to take is not compatible
with the standard model of decision making under risk, which is a theory of choice among
probability distributions over ￿nal outcomes.1
In this paper, we assume that the value of a lottery depends not only on its uncertainty,
but also on the way this uncertainty is resolved over time. Using this assumption, we
provide a choice theoretic framework that can address the experimental evidence above while
pinpointing the required deviations from the standard model. We exploit the structure of
the model to identify the links between the temporal aspect of risk aversion, a static attitude
towards risk, and intrinsic preferences for information.
In order to facilitate exposition, we mainly consider a decision maker (DM) whose pref-
erences are de￿ned over the set of two-stage lotteries, namely lotteries over lotteries over
outcomes. Following Segal [1990], we replace the reduction of compound lotteries axiom (an
axiom that imposes indi⁄erence between compound lotteries and their reduced single-stage
counterparts) with the following two assumptions: time neutrality and recursivity. Time
neutrality says that DM does not care about the time in which uncertainty is resolved as
long as resolution happens in a single stage. Recursivity is a substitution property, which
says that if DM prefers a single-stage lottery p to a single-stage lottery q, then he also prefers
to substitute q with p in any two-stage lottery containing q as an outcome. Under these as-
sumptions, any two-stage lottery is subjectively transformed into a simpler, one-stage lottery.
In particular, there exists a single preference relation over the set of one-stage lotteries that
fully determines DM￿ s preferences over the richer domain of two-stage lotteries.
In order to link behavior in both domains, we introduce the following two properties: the
1All lotteries discussed in this paper are objective, that is, the probabilities are known. Knight [1921]
proposed distinguishing between risk and uncertainty according to whether the probabilities are given to us
objectively or not. Despite this distinction, we will use both notions interchangeably.
2￿rst is dynamic while the second is static.
￿ Preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty (PORU). DM has PORU if he always
prefers any two-stage lottery to be resolved in a single stage. PORU implies an aversion
to receiving partial information and it captures the idea that the frequency at which
the outcomes of a random process are evaluated is a relevant economic variable. This
notion formalizes an idea ￿rst raised by Palacios-Huerta [1999] (to be further discussed
in the literature review section).
￿ Negative certainty independence (NCI). NCI states that if DM prefers lottery p to
the (degenerate) lottery that yields the prize x for certain, then this ranking is not
reversed when we mix both options with any common, third lottery q. This axiom
is similar to Kahneman and Tversky￿ s [1979] ￿certainty e⁄ect￿ hypothesis, though
it does not imply that people weigh probabilities non-linearly. The restrictions NCI
imposes on preferences are just enough to explain commonly observed behavior in the
common-ratio version of the Allais paradox (also known as ￿common-ratio e⁄ect with
a certain prize￿ ). In particular, NCI allows the vNM-independence axiom to fail when
the certainty e⁄ect is present.
Proposition 1 establishes that NCI and PORU are equivalent. On the one hand, numer-
ous replications of the Allais paradox in the last ￿fty years prove NCI to be one of the most
prominently observed preference patterns. On the other hand, empirical and experimental
studies involving dynamic choices and experimental studies on preference for uncertainty res-
olution are still rather rare. The disproportional amount of evidence in favor of each property
strengthens the importance of Proposition 1, since it provides new theoretical predictions
for dynamic behavior, based on robust (static) empirical evidence.
In an extended model, we allow DM to take intermediate actions (between the two
stages of a lottery) that might a⁄ect his ultimate payo⁄. The primitive in such a model
is a preference relation over information systems, which is induced from preferences over
compound lotteries. An immediate consequence of Blackwell￿ s [1953] seminal result is that
in the standard expected utility class, DM always prefers to have perfect information before
making the decision, which allows him to choose the optimal action corresponding to the
resulting state. Safra and Sulganik [1995] left open the question of whether there are non-
expected utility preferences for which, when applied recursively, a perfect information system
is always the most valuable. Proposition 2 shows that this property, that we term preferences
for perfect information, is equivalent to PORU. As a corollary, NCI is both a necessary and
su¢ cient condition to have preferences for perfect information.
3PORU implies that preferences over one-stage lotteries are quasi-concave. Adding the
requirement that they are also quasi-convex, we con￿ne our attention to the class of between-
ness preferences (Chew [1983], Dekel [1986]), one of the most commonly used non-expected
utility models. Within this class, axiom NCI has its own static implications. First, it is
equivalent to a geometric condition, which we term the steepest middle slope, that is im-
posed on the map of indi⁄erence curves in every unit probability triangle. The steepest
middle slope property indicates that for every triple of prizes x3 > x2 > x1, the marginal
rate of substitution between a probability shift from x2 to x3 and a probability shift from x2
to x1 is maximized on the indi⁄erence curve through the lottery that yields x2 for certain.2
Second, betweenness preferences yield an implicit expected utility representation of the form
V (p) =
P
x u(x;V (p))p(x), where the utility index u depends on both the prize x and the
utility level V (p). Suppose that u is at least twice di⁄erentiable with respect to both argu-
ments (which implies that the function V is FrØchet di⁄erentiable). Under this smoothness
assumption, NCI turns out to be equivalent to the vNM-independence axiom.
The idea that individuals prefer one-shot resolution of uncertainty can be quanti￿ed. The
gradual resolution premium of any compound lottery is the amount that DM would pay to
replace that lottery with its single-stage counterpart. Similarly to the standard risk premium,
the gradual resolution premium is measured in monetary terms. In the case where DM is both
risk averse and displays PORU, these two forces magnify each other. This observation can
explain why people often purchase dynamic insurance contracts, such as periodic insurance
for electrical appliances and cellular phones, at much more than actuarially fair rates.
The gradual resolution premium can be signi￿cant, in the sense that if the resolution
process is ￿long￿enough, individuals might be extremely reluctant to take risks. To illus-
trate this, we ￿rst extend our results to preferences over arbitrary n-stage lotteries. The
parameter n describes the frequency with which an individual updates information in a ￿xed
time interval. Qualitatively, the results remain intact; DM who has preferences for one-shot
resolution of uncertainty prefers to replace each compound sub-lottery with its single-stage
counterpart. We then look at preferences of the disappointment aversion class (Gul [1991]).
Such preferences satisfy NCI, and therefore, in a dynamic context, PORU. We show that
for any one-stage lottery, there exists a multi-stage lottery (with the same probability dis-
tribution over terminal prizes) whose value is arbitrarily close to that of getting the worst
prize for sure. While referring to the problem of repeated investment, Gollier [2001] states
that ￿the central theoretical question of the link between the structure of the utility function
and the horizon-riskiness relationship remained unsolved.￿Our result shows that preferences
2As de￿ned by Machina [1982], this marginal rate of substitution is the amount of probability that should
be shifted from x2 to x3 per a unit shift of probability from x2 to x1 in order to keep DM indi⁄erent.
4that display PORU may lead to excessively conservative investment strategies.
1.1. Related literature
Con￿ning his attention to binary single-stage lotteries and to preferences from the rank-
dependent utility class (RDU, Quiggin [1982]), Segal ([1987], [1990]) discusses su¢ cient
conditions under which the desirability of a two-stage lottery decreases as the two stages
become less degenerate. We show in Proposition 3 that these conditions cannot be extended
to the general case, that is, the only RDU preferences that satisfy PORU are expected utility.
Palacios-Huerta [1999] was the ￿rst to raise the idea that the form of the timing of resolution
of uncertainty might be an important economic variable. By working out an example, he
demonstrates that DM with Gul￿ s [1991] disappointment aversion preferences will be averse
to the sequential resolution of uncertainty, or, in the language of this paper, will be displaying
PORU. He also discusses numerous applications. Ang, Bekaert and Liu [2005] use recursive
disappointment aversion preferences to study a dynamic portfolio choice designed to obtain
the most preferred probability distribution over ￿nal wealth levels. The general theory we
suggest provides a way to understand which attribute of Gul￿ s preferences accounts for the
resulting behavior. It also makes a clear distinction between two notions of disappointment:
The common static notion of disappointment, as it appears in the literature, and the dynamic
version implied by PORU.
Schmidt [1998] develops a static model of expected utility with certainty preferences. His
notion of certainty preferences is very close to axiom NCI. In his model, the value of any
non-degenerate lottery is the expectation of a utility index over prizes, u, whereas the value
of the degenerate lottery that yields the prize x for sure is v (x). The certainty e⁄ect is
captured by requiring v (x) > u(x) for all x. Schmidt￿ s model violates both continuity and
monotonicity with respect to ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, while in this paper we con￿ne
our attention to preferences that satisfy both properties.3
Loss aversion with narrow framing (also known as ￿myopic loss aversion￿ ) is a combina-
tion of two motives: loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]), that is, people￿ s tendency
to be more sensitive to losses than to gains, and narrow framing, that is, a dynamic aggre-
gation rule that argues that when making a series of choices, individuals ￿bracket￿them
by making each choice in isolation.4 Benartzi and Thaler [1995] were the ￿rst to use this
3Continuity and monotonicity ensure that the certainty equivalent of each lottery is well de￿ned. This
fact is used when applying the recursive structure of Segal￿ s model.
4Narrow framing is an example of people￿ s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately. This tendency
is illustrated in Tversky and Kahneman [1981], and further studied in Kahneman and Lovallo [1993] and
Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin [1999] among others. Barberis and Huang [2007] present an extensive survey
of this approach.
5approach to suggest explanations for several economic ￿anomalies￿ , such as the equity pre-
mium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott [1985]). Barberis and Huang [2007] and Barberis, Huang
and Thaler [2006] generalize Benartzi and Thaler￿ s work by assuming that DM derives utility
directly from the outcome of a gamble over and above its contribution to total wealth.
Our model can be used to address similar phenomena. The combination of the folding-
back procedure and a speci￿c form of atemporal preferences implies that individuals behave
as if they intertemporally perform narrow framing. The gradual resolution premium quan-
ti￿es this e⁄ect. The two approaches are conceptually di⁄erent: loss aversion with narrow
framing brings to the forefront the idea that individuals evaluate any new gamble separately
from its cumulative contribution to total wealth, while we maintain the assumption that
terminal wealth matters, and identify narrow framing as a temporal e⁄ect. In addition, we
set aside the question of why individuals are sensitive to the way uncertainty is resolved
(i.e. why they narrow frame), and construct a model that reveals the (context independent)
behavioral implications of such considerations.
K￿szegi and Rabin [2009] study a model in which utility additively depends on both
current consumption and on recent changes in (rational) beliefs about present and future
consumption, where the latter component displays loss aversion. In their setting, they iden-
tify narrow framing with preference over such ￿ uctuations in beliefs. They also show that
people prefer to get information clumped together (similar to PORU) rather than apart.
Aside from the same conceptual di⁄erences between the two approaches, their set of results
concerning information preferences is con￿ned to the case where consumption happens only
in the last period and is binary. This corresponds in our setup to lotteries over only two
monetary prizes. Our results are valid for lotteries with arbitrary (￿nite) support.
In this paper, we study time￿ s e⁄ect on preferences by distinguishing between one-shot
and gradual resolution of uncertainty. A di⁄erent, but complementary, approach is to study
intrinsic preferences for early or late resolution of uncertainty. This research agenda was
initiated by Kreps and Porteus [1978], and later extended by Epstein and Zin [1989] and
Epstein and Chew [1989] among others. Grant, Kajii and Polak [1998, 2000] connect prefer-
ences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty to intrinsic preferences for information. We
believe that both aspects of intrinsic time preferences play a role in most real life situations.
For example, an anxious student might prefer to know as soon as possible his ￿nal grade in
an exam, but still prefers to wait rather than to get the grade of each question separately.
The motivation to impose time neutrality is to demonstrate the role of the one-shot versus
gradual e⁄ect, which has been neglected in the literature to date.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we start section 2 by establishing our
6basic framework, after which we introduce the main behavioral properties of the paper and
state our main characterization results. Section 3 comments on the implications of our model
on preferences over information systems. In section 4, we elaborate on the static implications
of our model and provide examples. Section 5 ￿rst extends our results to preferences over
compound lotteries with an arbitrarily ￿nite number of stages. We then de￿ne the gradual
resolution premium and illustrate its magnifying e⁄ect. In section 6, we relate our approach
to the notion of loss aversion with narrow framing. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The model
2.1. Groundwork
Consider an interval [w;b] = X ￿ R of monetary prizes. Let L1 be the set of all simple
lotteries (probability measures with ￿nite support) over X. That is, each p 2 L1 is a function
p : X ! [0;1], satisfying
P
x2X p(x) = 1, and we restrict our analysis to the case where
in any given lottery, the number of prizes with non-zero probability is ￿nite. Let S (p) =
fxjp(x) > 0g. For each p, q 2 L1 and ￿ 2 (0;1), the mixture ￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q 2 L1 is the
simple lottery that yields each prize x with probability ￿p(x)+(1 ￿ ￿)q (x). We denote by
￿x 2 L1 the degenerate lottery that gives the prize x with certainty, that is, ￿x (x) = 1. Note
that for any lottery p 2 L1 we have p =
P
x2X p(x)￿x.
Correspondingly, let L2 be the set of all simple lotteries over L1. That is, each Q 2 L2
is a function Q : L1 ! [0;1], satisfying
P
p2L1 Q(p) = 1. For each P, Q 2 L2 and ￿2 (0;1),
the mixture R = ￿P + (1 ￿ ￿)Q 2 L2 is the two-stage lottery for which R(p) = ￿P (p) +
(1 ￿ ￿)Q(p). We denote by Dp 2 L2 the degenerate, in the ￿rst stage, compound lottery
that gives lottery p in the second stage with certainty, that is, Dp (p) = 1. Note that for
any lottery Q 2 L2 we have Q =
P
q2L1 Q(q)Dq. We think of each Q 2 L2 as a dynamic
two-stage process where, in the ￿rst stage, a lottery q is realized with probability Q(q), and,
in the second stage, a prize is obtained according to q.
Two special subsets of L2 are ￿ = fDp j p2 L1g, the set of degenerate lotteries in L2
and ￿ = fQ 2 L2 jQ(p) > 0 ) p = ￿x for some x 2 Xg, the set of lotteries in L2, outcome
of which are degenerate in L1. Note that both ￿ and ￿ are isomorphic to L1.
Let ￿ be a continuous (in the topology of weak convergence) preference relation over
L2. Let ￿￿ and ￿￿ be the restriction of ￿ to ￿ and ￿ respectively. On ￿ we impose the
following axioms:
A0 (more is better): 8x;y 2 X, x ￿ y , D￿x ￿ D￿y
7A1 (time neutrality): 8p2 L1, Dp ￿
P
x2X p(x)D￿x
A2 (recursivity): 8q;p2 L1, all Q 2 L2, and ￿2 (0;1),
Dp ￿ Dq () ￿Dp + (1 ￿ ￿)Q ￿ ￿Dq + (1 ￿ ￿)Q
A0 is a weak monotonicity assumption. By postulating A1, we assume that DM does not
care about the time in which the uncertainty is resolved as long as it happens in a single stage.
A2 assumes that preferences are recursive. It states that preferences over two-stage lotteries
respect the preference relation over degenerate two-stage lotteries (that is, over single-stage
lotteries), in the sense that two compound lotteries that di⁄er only in the outcome of a single
branch are compared exactly as these di⁄erent outcomes would be compared separately.
Lemma 1: If ￿ satis￿es A0, A1 and A2, then both ￿￿ and ￿￿ are monotone (with
respect to the relation of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance).5
Proposition (Segal [1990]): ￿ satis￿es A0, A1 and A2 if and only if, there exists a





= V (p) for all p 2 L1, and for all P, Q 2 L2:









Note that under A0, A1 and A2, the preference relation ￿￿=￿￿ fully determines ￿.
The decision maker evaluates two-stage lotteries by ￿rst calculating the certainty equivalent
of every second-stage lottery using the preferences represented by V , and then calculating
(using V again) the ￿rst-stage value by treating the certainty equivalents of the former stage
as the relevant prizes. Since only the function V appears in the formula above, we slightly
abuse notation by writing V (Q) for the value of the two-stage lottery Q. Lastly, since under




for all p 2 L1, we simply write
V (p) for this common value.
2.2. Main properties
We now introduce and motivate our two main behavioral assumptions. The ￿rst is dynamic,
whereas the second is static. Our static properties are imposed on preference relations over
5A0, A1 and A2 imply that both ￿￿ and ￿￿ satisfy the axiom of degenerate independence, ADI (Grant,
Kajii and Polak [1992]). Simple induction arguments show that ADI is equivalent to monotonicity with
respect to the relation of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.
8sets that are isomorphic to L1 (such as ￿￿ and ￿￿ ). We denote by ￿1 such a generic
preference relation and assume throughout that it is continuous and monotone.
2.2.1. Preference for one-shot resolution of uncertainty
We model an individual, DM, whose concept of uncertainty is multi-stage and who cares
about the way uncertainty is resolved over time. In this section, we de￿ne consistent prefer-
ences to have all uncertainty resolved in one-shot rather than gradually, or vice versa.
De￿ne ￿ : L2 ! L1 to be the reduction operator that maps a compound lottery to
its reduced single-stage counterpart, that is, ￿(Q) =
P








De￿nition 1: The preference relation ￿ displays preference for one-shot resolution of un-
certainty (PORU) if 8Q 2 L2, D￿(Q) ￿ Q. If 8Q 2 L2, Q ￿ D￿(Q), then ￿ displays preference
for gradual resolution of uncertainty (PGRU).
PORU implies an aversion to receiving partial information. If uncertainty is not fully
resolved in the ￿rst stage, DM prefers to remain fully unaware till the ￿nal resolution is
available. PGRU implies the opposite. As we will argue in later sections, these notions
render ￿the frequency at which the outcomes of a random process are evaluated￿a relevant
economic variable.6
2.2.2. The ratio Allais paradox and axiom NCI
In a generic Allais-type questionnaire (also known as ￿common-ratio e⁄ect with a certain
prize￿ ) subjects choose between A and B, where A = ￿3000 and B = 0:8￿4000 + 0:2￿0. They
also choose between C and D, where C = 0:25￿3000 + 0:75￿0 and D = 0:2￿4000 + 0:8￿0. The
majority of subjects tend to systematically violate expected utility by choosing the pair A
and D.7
Since Allais￿ s [1953] original work, numerous versions of his questionnaire have appeared,
many of which contain one lottery that does not involve any risk.8 Kahneman and Tversky
6Halevy [2007] provides some evidence in favor of PORU. In his paper, subjects were asked to state their
reservation prices for four di⁄erent compound lotteries. His results (which are discussed in section 4.2.1 of
his paper) show that the reservation prices of the two degenerate two-stage lotteries (V 1 and V 4, members
of ￿ and ￿ respectively) were approximately the same and larger than the reservation price of the gradually
resolved lottery (V 3).
7This example is taken from Kahneman and Tversky [1979]. Of 95 subjects, 80% choose A over B, 65%
choose D over C, and more than half choose the pair A and D.
8Camerer [1995] is an extensive survey of the experimental evidence against expected utility, including
the ￿common consequence e⁄ect￿and ￿common ratio e⁄ect￿that are related to Allais paradox.
9[1979] use the term ￿certainty e⁄ect￿to explain the commonly observed behavior. Their idea
is that individuals tend to put more weight on certain events in comparison with very likely,
yet uncertain, events. This reasoning is behaviorally translated into a nonlinear probability-
weighting function, ￿ : [0;1] ! [0;1], that individuals are assumed to use when evaluating
risky prospects. In particular, this function has a steep slope near￿or even a discontinuity
point at￿0 and 1. As we remark below, this implication has its own limitations. We suggest
a property that is motivated by similar insights and captures the certainty e⁄ect without
implying that people weigh probabilities non-linearly. Consider the following axiom on ￿1:
Negative Certainty Independence (NCI): 8p;q;￿x 2 L1 and ￿ 2 [0;1], p ￿1 ￿x implies
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q ￿1 ￿￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)q.
The axiom states that if the sure outcome x is not enough to compensate DM for the
risky prospect p, then mixing it with any other lottery, thus eliminating its certainty appeal,
will not result in the mixture of x being more attractive than the corresponding mixture of
p. If we de￿ne c(pj￿;q), the conditional certainty equivalent of a lottery p, as the solution
to ￿p+(1￿￿)q ￿1 ￿￿c(pj￿;q) +(1￿￿)q, then the axiom implies that c(pj￿;q) ￿ c(p) for all
p;q 2 L1 and ￿ 2 (0;1). The implication of this axiom on responses to the Allais question-
naire above is as follows: If you choose the non-degenerate lottery B, then you must also
choose D. This prediction is empirically rarely violated in versions of the Allais questionnaire
that involved positive outcomes.9;10 As we have mentioned before, the intuition behind NCI
is that the sure outcome loses relatively more (or gains relatively less) than any other lottery
from the mixture with the other lottery q. NCI, however, does not imply any probabilistic
distortion. This observation becomes relevant in experiments similar to the one reported
in Conlisk [1989, p.398], who studies the robustness of Allais-type behavior to boundary
e⁄ects. Conlisk considers a slight perturbation of prospects similar to A;B;C and D above,
so that (i) each of the new prospects, A0;B0;C0 and D0, yields all three prizes with strictly
positive probability, and (ii) in the resulting ￿displaced Allais question￿(namely choosing
between A0 and B0 and then choosing between C0 and D0), the only pattern of choice that is
consistent with expected utility is either the pair A0 and C0 or the pair B0 and D0. Although
violations of expected utility become signi￿cantly less frequent and are no longer systematic
(a result that supports the claim that violations can be explained by the certainty e⁄ect), a
nonlinear probability function predicts that this increase in consistency would be the result
9Conlisk [1989], for example, replicates the two basic Allais questions. About half of his subjects (119 out
of 236) violate expected utility. The fraction of violations that are of the B and C type is 16=119 ’ 0:13.
10It is worth mentioning that there is also some empirical and experimental evidence that con￿ icts with
NCI. For example, NCI will be inconsistent with the ￿re￿ ection e⁄ect￿ , that is, a common ratio e⁄ect with
negative numbers (Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Machina [1987]). I thank a referee for pointing this out.
10of fewer subjects choosing A0 over B0, and not because more subjects choose C0 over D0. In
fact, the latter occurred, which is consistent with NCI.
Proposition 1: Under A0; A1 and A2, ￿1 satis￿es NCI if and only if ￿ displays PORU.
Proof (only if): Suppose ￿1 satis￿es NCI. We need to show that an arbitrary two-stage
lottery, Q is never preferred to its single-stage counterpart, D￿(Q). Without loss of generality,



































































































































(if): Suppose ￿1 does not satisfy NCI. Then there exists p, q =
P
x q (x)￿x, ￿y 2 L1 and
￿ 2 (0;1), such that p ￿1 ￿y and ￿￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)q ￿1 ￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q. By monotonicity,
￿￿c(p) + (1 ￿ ￿)q ￿1 ￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q. Let Q := ￿Dp + (1 ￿ ￿)
P
x q (x)D￿x and note that,




x [￿p(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)q (x)]D￿x ￿ D￿(Q)
Violating PORU. ￿
Proposition 1 ties together two notions that are de￿ned on di⁄erent domains. The equiv-
alence of PORU and NCI suggests that being prone to Allais-type behavior and being averse
to the gradual resolution of uncertainty are synonymous. This assertion justi￿es the pro-
posed division of the space of two-stage lotteries into the one-shot and gradually resolved
11lotteries. On the one hand, numerous replications of the Allais paradox in the last ￿fty
years prove that the availability of a certain prize in the choice set a⁄ects behavior in a
systematic way. On the other hand, empirical and experimental studies involving dynamic
choices and experimental studies on preferences for uncertainty resolution are still rather
rare. Proposition 1 thus provides new theoretical predictions for dynamic behavior, based
on robust (static) empirical evidence.
3. PORU and the value of information
Suppose now that before the second stage lottery is played, but after the realization of the
￿rst stage lottery, the decision maker can take some action that might a⁄ect his ultimate
payo⁄. The primitive in such a model is a preference relation over information systems
(as we formally de￿ne below), which is induced from preferences over compound lotteries.
Assume throughout this section that preferences over compound lotteries satisfy A0￿A2. An
immediate consequence of Blackwell￿ s [1953] seminal result is that in the standard expected
utility class, DM always prefers to have perfect information before making the decision,
which allows him to choose the optimal action corresponding to the resulting state. Schlee
[1990] shows that if ￿1 is of the rank-dependent utility class (Quiggin [1982]), then the value
of perfect information will always be non-negative. This value is computed relative to the
value of having no information at all, and therefore Schlee￿ s result has no implications for
the comparison between getting complete and partial information. Safra and Sulganik [1995]
left open the question of whether there are static preference relations, other than expected
utility, for which, when applied recursively, perfect information is always the most valuable.
We show below that this property is equivalent to PORU. As a corollary, such preferences
for perfect information are fully characterized by NCI.
Formally, ￿x an interval of monetary prizes X ￿ R. Let S = fs1;:::;sNg be a ￿nite set
of possible states of nature. Each state s 2 S occurs with probability ps. Let J = fj1;:::;jMg
be a ￿nite set of signals, and let A = fa1;:::;aHg be a ￿nite set of actions. Let u : A￿S ! X
be a function that gives the deterministic outcome u(a;s) (an element of X) if action a 2 A






Let ￿ : S ￿ J ! [0;1] be a function such that ￿ (s;j) is the conditional probability of
getting the signal j 2 J when the prevailing state is s 2 S. We naturally require that for
all s 2 S,
P
j2J￿ (s;j) = 1 (so that when the prevailing state is s, there is some probability
distribution on the signals DM might get). The function ￿ is called an information system.
For any s 2 S, denote the updated probability of s after the signal j 2 J is obtained by
12p(sjj) =
￿(s;j)ps P
s02S ￿(s0;j)ps0. A full information system, I, is a function such that for all s 2 S
there exists j (s) 2 J with p(sjj (s)) = 1. The null information system, ￿, is a function such
that p(sjj) = ps for all s 2 S and j 2 J.
Let pj(a) 2 L1 be the second-stage lottery if signal j is obtained and action a 2 A is
taken, that is, pj(a) =
P
s2Sp(sjj)￿u(a;s). For aj 2 argmaxa2A V (pj(a)), let pj￿ := pj(aj).








be the value of the optimal compound lottery,
that is, the compound lottery assigning probability ￿j(￿) =
P
s2S￿ (s;j)ps to pj￿. Note that








, where a(s) is an
optimal action if you know that the prevailing state is s, that is, a(s) 2 argmaxa2A u(a;s).
De￿nition 2: ￿ displays preferences for perfect information if for every information en-
vironment ￿ and any information system ￿, V (I) ￿ V (￿).
Proposition 2: If ￿ satis￿es A0 ￿ A2, then the two statements below are equivalent:
(i) ￿ displays PORU
(ii) ￿ displays preferences for perfect information.
Analogously, PGRU holds if and only if for every information environment ￿ and any in-
formation system ￿, V (￿) ￿ V (￿).
Since any temporal lottery corresponds to an information environment in which for all
a 2 A, u(a;s) = v (s) 2 X, showing that (i) is necessary for (ii) is immediate. For the
other direction, we note that two forces reinforce each other: First, getting full information
means that the underlying lottery is of the ￿one-shot resolution￿type, since uncertainty is
completely resolved by observing the signal. Second, better information enables better plan-
ning; using it, a decision maker with monotonic preferences is sure to take the optimal action
in any state. The proof distinguishes between the two motives for getting full information:
The former, which is captured by PORU, is intrinsic, whereas the latter, which is re￿ ected
via the monotonicity of preferences with respect to outcomes, is instrumental. The result
for PGRU is similarly proven. The null information system is of the ￿one-shot resolution￿
type and it has no instrumental value. By combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we get:
Corollary 1: If ￿ satis￿es A0￿A2, then ￿ displays preferences for perfect information if
and only if ￿1 satis￿es NCI.
13Figure 1: The probability triangle (showing linear indi⁄erence curves). The bold indi⁄erence
curve through the origin demonstrates the steepest middle slope property (Lemma 3).
4. Static implications
4.1. NCI in the probability triangle
Fix three prizes x3 > x2 > x1. All lotteries over these prizes can be represented as points in
a two-dimensional space, ￿ := fp = (p1;p3)j p1;p3 ￿ 0; p1 + p3 ￿ 1g; as in ￿gure 1. The
origin (0;0) represents the lottery ￿x2. The probability of the high prize, p(x3) = p3, is mea-
sured on the vertical axis, and the probability of the low prize, p(x1) = p1, is measured on
the horizontal axis. The probability of obtaining the middle prize is p(x2) = p2 = 1￿p1￿p3.
Given these conventions, monotonicity implies that preferences increase in the northwest di-
rection. The properties below are geometric restrictions that NCI (hence PORU) imposes
on the map of indi⁄erence curves in any probability triangle ￿, that corresponds to some
triple x3 > x2 > x1.
Lemma 2 (quasi-concavity): If ￿1 satis￿es NCI, then V is quasi-concave, that is,
V (￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q) > minfV (p);V (q)g.
Corollary 2: If ￿1 satis￿es NCI, then all indi⁄erence curves in ￿ are convex.
Let ￿(p) be the slope, relative to the (p1;p3) coordinates, of the indi⁄erence curve at
lottery p. ￿(p) is the marginal rate of substitution between a probability shift from x2 to
x3 and a probability shift from x2 to x1. As explained by Machina [1982], changes in the
slope express local changes in attitude towards risk: the greater the slope, the more (local)
risk-averse DM is. Denote by ￿+ (p) the right derivative of the indi⁄erence curve at p and
by int(￿) the interior of ￿. Let I(p) := fq 2 ￿jq ￿ pg.
14De￿nition 3: We say that V satis￿es the steepest middle slope property if
(i) the indi⁄erence curve through the origin is linear, that is, q 2 I((0;0)) implies ￿(q) =









for all q 2 int(￿):11
Lemma 3 (steepest middle slope): If ￿1 satis￿es NCI, then V satis￿es the steepest
middle slope property.
Examples of preferences that satisfy NCI will be given in section 4.2.1. For now, we use
both lemmas to argue that two broad and widely used classes of preferences, rank-dependent
utility (RDU, Quiggin [1982]) and quadratic utility (Chew, Epstein and Segal [1991]), do
not satisfy NCI unless they coincide with expected utility.
Order the prizes x1 < x2 < ::: < xn. The functional form for RDU is:
V (
Pn












where g : [0;1] ! [0;1] is increasing, g (0) = 0 and g (1) = 1. If g (p) = p then RDU reduces
to expected utility.








where ’(xi;xj) : X ￿ X ! R is some symmetric function. If ’(xi;xj) =
u(x)+u(y)
2 then
quadratic utility reduces to expected utility.
Proposition 3: If ￿1 satis￿es NCI and is a member of either the RDU class or the quadratic
utility class, then V is an expected utility functional.12
11By Corollary 2, all the right derivatives exist (see Rockafellar [1970], p.214).
12Segal [1990, section 5] used a di⁄erent, but equivalent, way to write the functional form for RDU, using
the transformation f (p) = 1 ￿ g (1 ￿ p). He claims that within this model, if f is convex and its elasticity
is non-decreasing, then the desirability of a two-stage lottery of the form ￿D￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)D￿￿y+(1￿￿)￿x
decreases as the two stages become less degenerate. Similar results are stated in Segal [1987, theorem 4.2].
This condition is not su¢ cient to imply global PORU. For example, let f (p) = p2 , which satis￿es Segal￿ s
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15Con￿ning his attention to smooth preferences, in the sense that the function V is FrØchet
di⁄erentiable, Machina [1982] suggests the following fanning out property: For all p;q 2 ￿,
if p ￿rst-order stochastically dominates q, then ￿(p) > ￿(q). If for all such p 6= q we
have ￿(p) > ￿(q) then we say that ￿1 satis￿es the proper fanning out property. Lemma
3 immediately implies that if ￿1 satis￿es NCI, then ￿1 does not satisfy the proper fanning
out property. This observation does not contradict the usual explanation of fanning out as a
resolution to Allais paradox. Typical Allais experiments with positive outcomes (as the one
described in section 2) provide evidence of behavior in the lower-right sub-triangle. In this
region, NCI is consistent with fanning out.13
4.2. Betweenness
For the rest of the section, assume that ￿1 is quasi-convex, that is, 8 p;q 2 L1,
V (￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q) 6 maxfV (p);V (q)g. The conjunction of quasi-convexity with quasi-
concavity (Lemma 1) yields:
A3 (single-stage betweenness): 8 p;q 2 L1 and ￿ 2 [0;1], p ￿1 q implies p ￿1 ￿p +
(1 ￿ ￿)q ￿1 q
A3 is a weakened form of the vNM-independence axiom. It implies neutrality toward
randomization among equally-good lotteries. It yields the following representation:
Proposition (Chew [1983], Dekel [1986]): ￿1 satis￿es A3 i⁄ there exists a func-
tion u : X ￿ [0;1] ! [0;1], which is continuous in both arguments, strictly increasing in
the ￿rst argument and satis￿es u(w;v) = 0 and u(b;v) = 1 for all v2 [0;1], such that




The betweenness axiom (A3), along with monotonicity, implies that indi⁄erence curves
in any unit probability triangle are positively sloped straight lines. In particular, for any
lottery p 2 ￿ such that V (p) = v,
￿(p) = ￿(vjx3;x2;x1) =
u(x2;v) ￿ u(x1;v)
u(x3;v) ￿ u(x2;v)
13The behavioral evidence supporting fanning out is generally weaker in the upper-left sub triangle, the
more-preferred region, than in the lower region (see Camerer [1995]).
16In the case of betweenness, the steepest middle slope property reduces to the following
condition: For every triple x3 > x2 > x1 and for all v 2 (V (￿x1);V (￿x3)),
￿(V ((0;0))jx3;x2;x1) ￿ ￿(vjx3;x2;x1)
Our next result shows that within the betweenness class, this geometric condition is also
su¢ cient to PORU.
De￿nition 4: ￿2 is betweenness-recursive if it satis￿es A0￿A2 and its ￿1-type restric-
tions satisfy A3.
Proposition 4: For any betweenness-recursive preferences, the following three statements
are equivalent:
(i) ￿ displays PORU.
(ii) ￿1 satis￿es NCI.
(iii) ￿1 has the steepest middle slope property.
A characterization of PGRU is analogously obtained by reversing the weakly preferred sign
in NCI, and replacing steepest with ￿attest in (iii).
The applicability of the steepest middle slope property stems from its simplicity. In
order to detect violation of PORU, one need not construct the (potentially complicated)
exact choice problem. Rather, it is su¢ cient to introspect the slopes of one-dimensional
indi⁄erence curves. This, in turn, is a relatively simple task, at least once a local utility
function is given.
4.2.1. Examples
Expected utility preferences are a trivial example of preferences that in a dynamic context
satisfy PORU; DM with such preferences is just indi⁄erent to the way uncertainty is resolved.
The following is an important class of preferences for which, when applied recursively, PORU
is a meaningful concept:
Preferences that satisfy the linear mixed-fan hypothesis. This set consists of all
preferences whose indi⁄erence curves, in any unit probability triangle, are straight lines and
17have the following pattern: Moving northwest, they ￿rst get steeper (fanning out) in the lower
sub-triangle and then get ￿ atter (fanning in) in the upper sub-triangle. The switch between
fanning out and fanning in always occurs at the indi⁄erence curve that passes through the
origin, so that the steepest middle slope property is satis￿ed.
Gul￿ s [1991] model of disappointment aversion accommodates preferences that satisfy the




1+￿ ￿(x) > v
￿(x) ￿(x) 6 v
with ￿ > 0 and ￿ : X ! R increasing.
Gul￿ s notion of disappointment aversion amounts to dividing the support of each lot-
tery into two groups, the elated outcomes and the disappointed outcomes. A prize x is a
disappointing outcome in lottery p if V (p) > V (￿x) and is an elating outcome otherwise.
When calculating the (implicit) expected utility of a lottery, all disappointing outcomes get
a uniformly greater weight.14 For Gul￿ s preferences, the sign of ￿, the coe¢ cient of disap-
pointment aversion, unambiguously determines whether preferences satisfy PORU or PGRU
(see Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger [2006]).
4.2.2. NCI and di⁄erentiability
In most economic applications, it is assumed that individuals￿preferences are ￿smooth￿ .
Con￿ne our attention to the betweenness class, and suppose that u : X ￿ [0;1] ! [0;1] is
su¢ ciently di⁄erentiable with respect to both arguments. In this case, the function V is
(continuously) FrØchet di⁄erentiable (Epstein [1993], Wang [1993]).15 The following result
demonstrates that coupling this smoothness assumption with NCI leads us back to expected
utility.
Proposition 5: Suppose u(x;v) is at least twice di⁄erentiable with respect to both argu-
ments, and that all derivatives are continuous and bounded. Then preferences satisfy NCI if
and only if they are expected utility.
Expected utility preferences are characterized by the independence axiom that implies
NCI. To show the other direction, we ￿x v and denote by x(v) the unique x satisfying
14Although Gul￿ s preferences imply probability transformation, this transformation is done endogenously.
It is the value of each elated prize, and not its probability, which is explicitly down-weighted.
15The notion of smoothness we consider here is the one assumed in Neilson [1992]. For a formal de￿nition
of FrØchet di⁄erentiability, see Machina [1982]. Roughly speaking, FrØchet di⁄erentiability means that V (p)
changes continuously with p and that V can be locally approximated by a linear functional. The Economic
Meaning of FrØchet di⁄erentiability is discussed in Safra and Segal [2002].
18v = u(x;v). Combining the geometric characterization (Proposition 4 item (iii)) of NCI
with di⁄erentiability implies that for any x > x(v) > w, the derivative with respect to v
of the slope of an indi⁄erence curve on the corresponding probability triangle must vanish
at v. We use the fact that this statement is true for any x > x(v) and that v is arbitrary
to get a di⁄erential equation with a solution on f(x;v)jv < u(x;v)g given by u(x;v) =
h1 (v)g1 (x) + f1 (v), and h1 (v) > 0. We perform a similar exercise for x < x(v) < b
to uncover that on the other region, f(x;v)jv < u(x;v)g, u(x;v) = h2 (v)g2 (x) + f2 (v),
and h2 (v) > 0. Continuity and di⁄erentiability then imply that the functional form is
equal in both regions, therefore for all x, u(x;v) = h(v)g (x) + f (v); and h(v) > 0. The
uniqueness theorem for betweenness representations establishes the result.16
5. Gradual resolution premium
We now extend our results to ￿nite-stage lotteries.
5.1. Extension to n-stage lotteries
Fix n2 N and denote the space of ￿nite n-stage lotteries by Ln. The parameter n describes
the frequency with which an individual updates information in a ￿xed time interval. The
extension of our setting to Ln is the following (a formal description is given in the appendix):
equipped with a continuous and increasing function V : L1 ! R, DM evaluates any n-
stage lottery by folding back the probability tree and applying the same V in each stage.
Preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty implies that DM prefers to replace each
compound sub-lottery with its single-stage counterpart. The equivalence between PORU
and NCI remains intact. In what follows, we will continue simplifying notation by writing
V (Q) for the value of any multi-stage lottery Q. We sometimes write Qn to emphasize that
we consider an n-stage lottery.
5.2. De￿nitions
For any p 2 L1, denote by e(p) the expectation of p, that is, e(p) =
P
x xp(x). Let G(p;x) :=
P
z>x p(z). We say that lottery p second-order stochastically dominates lottery q, and
denote it by p sosd q, if for all t < K,
Pt
k=0 [G(p;xk+1) ￿ G(q;xk+1)][xk+1 ￿ xk] > 0, where
16Neilson [1992] provides su¢ cient conditions for smooth (in the sense of Proposition 5) betweenness pref-
erences to satisfy the mixed-fan hypothesis. The additional requirement, that the switch between ￿fanning
out￿and ￿fanning in￿always occurs at the indi⁄erence curve that passes through the origin (the lottery
that yields the middle prize for certain), renders those conditions empty, as is evident from Proposition 5.
19x0 < x1 < ::: < xK and fx0;x1;:::;xKg = S (p) [ S (q). DM is risk averse if 8p;q 2 L1 with
e(p) =e(q), p sosd q implies p ￿1 q.
For any p 2 L1, the risk premium of p, denoted by rp(p), is the number satisfying
￿e(p)￿rp(p) ￿1 p. rp(p) is the amount that DM would pay to replace p with its expected value.
By de￿nition, rp(p) > 0 whenever DM is risk averse.17
De￿nition 5: Fix p 2 L1, and let P (p) := fQj￿(Q) = pg. For any Q 2 P (p), the gradual





grp(Q) is the amount that DM would pay to replace Q with its single-stage counterpart.
By de￿nition, PORU implies grp(Q) > 0. Since c(p) =e(p)￿rp(p), we can, equivalently,





Observe that the signs of rp(p) and grp(Q), need not agree. In other words, (global) risk
aversion does not imply, and is not implied by, PORU. Indeed, Gul￿ s symmetric disappoint-
ment aversion preferences (see section 3) are risk averse if and only if ￿ > 0 and ￿ : X ! R
is concave (Gul￿ s [1991] theorem 3). However, for su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0 and su¢ ciently ￿,
one can ￿nd a lottery p with rp(p) < 0, whereas ￿ > 0 is su¢ cient for grp(Q) > 0 for all




x x > v
v ￿ ￿(v)(v ￿ x) x 6 v
has the property that u(￿;v) is concave for all v. Therefore, DM is globally risk averse
(Dekel￿ s [1986] property 2), and hence rp(p) > 0 8p 2 L1. However, these preferences do
not satisfy NCI,20 meaning that there exists Q 2 P (p) with grp(Q) < 0.
17Weak risk aversion is de￿ned as follows: For all p, ￿e(p) ￿ p. This de￿nition is not appropriate once we
consider preferences that are not expected utility. The de￿nition of the risk premium, on the other hand, is
independent of the preferences considered.
18The gradual resolution premium is measured in monetary units. It is di⁄erent from the timing premium
for early resolution, as suggested by Chew and Epstein [1989], which is de￿ned in terms of probabilities.
19The condition that ￿(v) is non-decreasing is both necessary and su¢ cient for u to be a local utility
function. See Nehring [2005].
20Look at the slope of an indi⁄erence curve for values x3 > v > x2 > x1. We have: ￿(vjx3;x2;x1) =
￿(v)(x2￿x1)
x3￿v+￿(v)(v￿x2). In this region, the slope is increasing in v if x3 >
￿(v)(￿(v)￿1)
￿0(v) + v. For a given v, we can
always choose arbitrarily large x3 that satis￿es the condition, and construct, by varying the probabilities,
a lottery whose value is equal to v. Apply this argument in the limit where v = x2 to violate item (iii) in
Proposition 4.
205.3. The magnifying e⁄ect
In the case where DM is both risk averse and displays PORU, these two forces magnify each
other. By varying the parameter n, we change the frequency at which DM updates informa-
tion. Our next result demonstrates that high frequency of information updates (su¢ ciently
large value of n) alone might in￿ ict an extreme cost on DM; a particular splitting of a lottery
drives down its value to the value of the worst prize in its support. For purposes of clarity,
we state our result in terms of Gul￿ s disappointment aversion preferences (see section 4).
Proposition 6: Consider disappointment aversion preferences with some ￿ : X ! R and
￿ > 0. For any " > 0 and for any lottery p =
Pm
j=1p(xj)￿xj, there exists T < 1 and a






Let p be a binary lottery that yields 0 and 1 with equal probabilities. Consider n tosses
of an unbiased coin. De￿ne a series of random variables fzig
n
i=1 with zi = 1 if the ith toss is













Note that the value of this n-stage lottery, calculated using recursive disappointment
aversion preferences, is identical to the value calculated using recursive expected utility and
probability 0:5








and therefore, for n large enough, the value approaches ￿(0). We use a similar construction
to establish that this result holds true for any lottery.
5.4. Application, an insurance problem
Understanding the magnifying e⁄ect, insurance companies, when o⁄ering dynamic insurance
contracts, can require much greater premiums than the actuarially fair ones and still be
sure of consumers￿participation. This can explain why people often buy periodic insurance
for moderately priced objects, such as electrical appliances and cellular phones, at much
more than the actuarially fair rates. An example is given by Tim Harford (￿The Undercover
Economist￿ , Financial Times, May 13, 2006):
21￿There is plenty of overpriced insurance around. A popular cell phone retailer
will insure your $90 phone for $1.70 a week￿ nearly $90 a year. The fair price of
the insurance is probably closer to $9 a year than $90.￿
To illustrate, consider the following insurance problem: An individual with Gul￿ s pref-
erences, with a linear ￿ and a positive coe¢ cient of disappointment aversion ￿, owns an
appliance (e.g. a cellular phone) that he is about to use for n periods. The individual
gets utility 1 in any period the appliance is used and 0 otherwise. In each period, there is
an exogenous probability (1 ￿ p) that the appliance will not work (it might be broken, fail
to get reception, etc.). The individual can buy a periodic insurance, which guarantees the
availability of the appliance, for a price z 2 (1 ￿ p;1). Therefore, if he buys insurance for
some period, he gets a certain utility of (1 ￿ z), and otherwise he faces the lottery in which
with a probability p he gets 1, and with the remaining probability he gets 0. For simplicity,
assume that the price of a replacement appliance is 0, so that the individual either still has
it from the last period or gets a new one for free in the beginning of any period.
Let b p be the probability distribution over ￿nal outcomes (without insurance). Denote
by X the total number of periods in which the appliance works. Since X is a binomial
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n￿k, for k = 0;:::;n. Applying Gul￿ s formula,
one obtains:
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where h(p;￿;n) is the unique natural number such that all prizes greater than it are elated
and all those smaller than it are disappointed.
Let Q be the corresponding gradual (n-stage) lottery as perceived by DM. Its value is:
V￿;n (Q) :=
1









k (1 ￿ p)
n￿k (1 + ￿)
n￿k k
Using standard backward induction arguments, it can be shown that DM will buy insur-
ance for all periods if ￿ >
z￿(1￿p)
(1￿z)(1￿p) > 0. In that case, z < 1 ￿
V￿;n(Q)
n . Nevertheless, if ￿ is
not too high,21 we have 1￿p < 1￿
V￿;n(b p)
n < z, meaning that DM would not buy insurance at
all if he could avoid being aware of the gradual resolution of uncertainty.22 This observation
explains why and how the attractiveness of a lottery depends not only on the uncertainty
embedded in it, but also on the way this uncertainty is resolved over time.










22Nayyar [2004] termed such a situation an ￿insurance trap￿ . Note that DM still acts rationally given that
without insurance he is forced to be exposed to Qn rather than to p.
22Since V￿;n (b p) decreases with ￿, rp(￿ jp;n) := np￿V￿;n (b p) is a strictly increasing function
of ￿. The behavior of the gradual resolution premium, grp(￿ jp;n) := V￿;n (b p) ￿ V￿;n (Q) is
more subtle. We have the following result:
Proposition 7: In the insurance problem described above:
(i) Strict PORU in the interior: grp(￿ jp;n) > 0 8￿ 2 (0;1)
(ii) Weak PORU in the extreme: grp(0jp;n) = 0 and lim
￿!1
grp(￿ jp;n) = 0
(iii) Single-peakness: There exists ￿￿ (p;n) < 1 such that either 0 < ￿ < ￿0 < ￿￿ or
￿￿ < ￿0 < ￿ implies
grp(￿ jp;n) < grp(￿
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Figure 2: grp(￿ jp;n). ￿k;k+1 is the value of ￿ where h(￿ jp;n) decreases from (n ￿ k) to
(n ￿ (k + 1)). grp(￿ jp;n) is non-di⁄erentiable in each such ￿k;k+1. k0 is the smallest natural




Recall that in Gul￿ s model, the sign of the parameter ￿ determines whether preferences
display PORU or PGRU. In its original context, greater ￿ implies greater disappointment
aversion (as well as greater risk aversion). PORU can be interpreted as dynamic disap-
pointment aversion. As suggested by Palacios-Huerta [1999], being exposed to the resolution
process bears the risk of perceiving intermediate outcomes as disappointing or elating. In-
dividuals who are more sensitive to disappointments su⁄er from getting partial information
and, therefore, prefer all uncertainty to be resolved in a single point in time. Under this
interpretation, it seems intuitive to expect the gradual resolution premium to be an increas-
23ing function of ￿. This intuition is wrong and, in fact, item (ii) remains valid independent
of the decision problem under consideration. To see this, note that grp(￿ jp;n) is de￿ned
as the di⁄erence of two functions, both strictly decreasing with ￿. When ￿ = 0, DM cares
only about the expected value of the lottery. When ￿ is su¢ ciently large, all prizes but
0 become elated, and hence the value of p converges to 0. Correspondingly, the value of
the gradual lottery converges to the value of the worst sub-lottery that by itself approaches
0. Since grp(￿ jp;n) is a continuous function and is strictly positive on the positive reals,
there must exist a ￿nite ￿, denoted ￿￿ in ￿gure 2, in which grp(￿ jp;n) is maximized.
Item (iii) sheds further light on the behavior of moderate disappointment-averse individu-
als. It suggests that ￿￿ (p;n) is unique, and that grp(￿ jp;n) is single-peaked. Behaviorally
speaking, moderately disappointment-averse individuals are more inclined to pay a higher
premium than individuals who are either approximately disappointment-indi⁄erent or ex-
tremely disappointment-averse.
6. PORU, ￿loss aversion with narrow framing￿and the ￿nal-wealth
hypothesis
Loss aversion with narrow framing is a combination of two motives: loss aversion, that is,
people￿ s tendency to be more sensitive to losses than to gains, and a dynamic aggregation
rule, narrow framing, that argues that when making a series of choices, individuals ￿bracket￿
them by making each choice in isolation (an extensive review of this approach is given in
Barberis and Huang [2007]). When applied to behavior in ￿nancial markets, narrow framing
means that individuals evaluate long-term investments based on their short-term returns.
Benartzi and Thaler [1995] were the ￿rst to use this approach and suggest explanations
for several economic ￿anomalies￿ , such as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott
[1985]). Barberis and Huang [2007] and Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006] generalize Be-
nartzi and Thaler￿ s work by assuming that DM derives utility directly from the outcome of
a gamble over and above its contribution to total wealth.
Our model can be used to address similar phenomena. The combination of a speci￿c
form of atemporal preferences and the folding-back procedure accounts for PORU. In an
intertemporal context, these two features are analogous to loss aversion and narrow framing,
respectively. The gradual resolution premium is the cost an individual incurs from frequently
evaluating the outcomes of a dynamic random process.
The loss aversion with narrow framing approach challenges the hypothesis that only ￿nal
wealth matters. Rabin [2000] and Safra and Segal [2008] give a parallel critique on a broad
class of smooth models of decision making under risk. These authors use calibration results
24to argue that modest risk aversion over small stakes gambles necessarily implies absurd levels
of risk aversion over large stakes gambles. Both Safra and Segal [2008] and Barberis Huang
and Thaler [2006] argue that if DM faces some background risk, then a similar problem
persists even if preferences are non-di⁄erentiable (i.e. if preferences display ￿rst-order risk
aversion);23 merging new gambles with preexisting ones eliminates the e⁄ect of ￿rst-order
risk aversion.
Our model is consistent with risk aversion over small stakes gambles and only moderate
risk aversion over large stakes gambles even if individuals face background risks. Our in-
terpretation is that the value of a lottery depends not only on its uncertainty, but also on
the way this uncertainty is resolved over time. In particular, if most uncertainty resolves
gradually and is evaluated frequently enough, then it generally cannot be compounded into a
single lottery. Our model permits ￿rst-order risk aversion over each realized gamble (as, for
example, in the case of Gul￿ s model discussed in the previous section), and hence a Rabin-
type critique does not apply. In other words, the mere existence of other risks is not enough
to eliminate the e⁄ect of ￿rst-order risk aversion. Such an argument is only compelling if
DM compounds risks that are resolved over a long period.
The conceptual di⁄erence between the two approaches is twofold. First, loss aversion
with narrow framing brings to the forefront the idea that individuals evaluate any new
gamble separately from its cumulative contribution to total wealth. Both the reference
points relative to which gains and losses are computed and the way they dynamically adjust
are usually set exogenously.24 We, on the other hand, maintain the assumption that terminal
wealth matters, and identify narrow framing as a parameter that measures the frequency
with which DM evaluates lotteries.25 The similarity between ￿disappointment aversion￿and
￿loss aversion￿has already been pointed out in Gul [1991] and stimulates further comparisons
between these two notions. The novel insight provided by proposition 6 is that the (temporal)
e⁄ect of narrow framing can be achieved even without giving up the assumption that utility
depends on overall wealth, and that this e⁄ect is quantitatively important, provided that the
23First order risk aversion means that the premium a risk averse DM is willing to pay to avoid an actuarially
fair random variable te ￿ is proportional, for small t, to t. It implies ￿kinked￿indi⁄erence curves along the
main diagonal in a states-of-the-world representation (Segal and Spivak [1990]).
24K￿szegi and Rabin [2006, 2008], and Matthey [2008] o⁄er models in which the reference point is deter-
mined endogenously.
25There might be circumstances in which it would be di¢ cult to relate the parameter n to any observable
physical lottery. For example, suppose there is a ￿ ow of information that DM can privately decide how often
to observe. In such situations, n can be interpreted as a subjective temporal e⁄ect, that is, as the resolution
sensitivity of an individual. When we write an n-stage lottery, the implicit assumption is that this is the
multi-stage lottery as perceived by DM and that he does not further compound risks. The interpretation
of n as a preference parameter is perhaps more compelling if it is accompanied by a formal modeling of the
information ￿ ow and the actions available to DM, which we do not pursue in this paper.
25parameter n is su¢ ciently large. Second, we set aside the question of why individuals are
sensitive to the way uncertainty is resolved (i.e. why they narrow frame),26 and construct a
model that reveals the (context independent) behavioral implications of such considerations.
7. Appendix
7.1. Extension to n-stage lotteries, a formal description
The following is a formal description of any compound lottery, or a probability tree. Let T be
a ￿nite set of (chance) nodes. Let Bp, ￿predecessor of￿ , be a partial order on T with x Bp y
if x precedes y. For any node t2 T, let PRE (t) = fx : x Bp tg be the set of predecessors
of t. For any t;t0 2 T, we say that t is an immediate predecessor of t0, and denote it by




. An initial node is any
t 2 T with PRE (t) = ?. A pair (T; Bp) is a tree if it has a single initial node, and if
for all t 2 T, PRE (t) is totally ordered by Bp (so that each node t has no more than one
immediate predecessor).
We say that T is of length n if each complete path in T is of length n. Denote by T k the
set of stage k￿ s nodes. We have
Sn+1
k=1T k = T. A node s is an immediate successor of t i⁄ t
is an immediate predecessor of s, that is , s Bis t () t Bip s. Let F (t) = fx : x Bis tg. Let
(gt)t2T be a collection of probability distributions, one for each node, over F (t). If F (z) = ?,
we say that z is a terminal node. Denote by T n+1 the set of all terminal nodes. We identify
T n+1 as the set of ultimate prizes. For any k2 f1;2;:::;ng, we identify t 2 T k as a compound
lottery, starting at time k, of length n + 1 ￿ k. In order to agree with other notations in
the text, we write any such lottery as Qn+1￿k (t). Finally, let ￿l be the set of lotteries of the
following form: For all j 6= l, every t 2 T j is a trivial node (i.e. jF (t)j = 1). In time l, a
certain one-stage lottery is acted out.
Let ￿n be a complete and transitive binary relation over Ln, on which we impose the
following axioms:
For any l 2 f1;2;::;ng, let ￿l
q be the member of ￿l with the single-stage lottery being q.
A10 : 8q 2 L1 and for all l;l0 2 f1;2;::;ng, c ￿n ￿l0
q.
A20 : Fix t￿ 2 T n. Suppose that for all t 2 T=ft￿g, F (t) is the same in both Qn and Qn0. If
26Barberis and Huang [2006] suggest two di⁄erent underlying sources of narrow framing. The ￿rst is based
on a non-consumption utility, such as regret, and the second relates narrow framing to the "accessibility"
of the uncertainty people confront. As these authors mention, each such motive, if taken literally, predicts
di⁄erent duration of narrow framing.
26Qn yields the lottery q in t￿ and Qn0 yields the lottery q0in t￿, then Qn ￿n Qn0 () ￿n
q ￿n ￿n
q0.
The implied value of any compound lottery is the following: For any t 2 T n, de￿ne














2 X is the certainty equivalent of Ql (s).
Lastly, and using the representation above, we extend the de￿nition of PORU to this
richer domain. Let Qn; Qn0 2 Ln be two compound lotteries that are equal except in one
sub-lottery of length n + 1 ￿ k, k 2 f2;3;:::;n ￿ 1g that originates from some t￿ 2 T k.
That is, for all t 2 T such that t￿ = 2 PRE (t), F (t) is the same in both Qn and Qn0. De-
note the associate (di⁄erent) sub-lotteries by Q
n+1￿k
Qn (t￿) and Q
n+1￿k
Qn0 (t￿), respectively. Let
p =
P
s2F(t￿)gt￿ (s)￿c(Qn+1￿(k+1)(s)). De￿ne the set P (p) just as in section 5.











= W (Q2) for some Q2 2 P (p)
imply Qn ￿n Qn0.
Proposition 1￿ : under A0; A10 and A20, Proposition 1 remains intact.
For brevity, we omit the detailed proof. It simply involved a repeated use of A0; A10 and
A20 to transform the problem into the framework of section 2.
7.2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
Since any temporal lottery corresponds to some information environment in which
u(a;s) = v (s) 2 X for all a 2 A, showing that (i) is necessary for (ii) is immediate. To show




. Let Q and pj be two in-
termediate lotteries, where pj assigns probability p(sjj) to the outcome u(a(s);s), and the
compound lottery Q assigns probability ￿j(￿) to pj, that is , Q =
P
j2J￿j(￿)D￿u(a(s);s).
Clearly, since for each state s and for any action a we have u(a;s) ￿ u(a(s);s), by
monotonicity of the value of a lottery with respect to the relation of ￿rst-order stochas-
tic dominance, V (pj￿) ￿ V (pj), and hence, by the same reason, also V (￿) ￿ V (Q).
However, now Q is simply the folding back of the two-stage lottery, which when played
in one-shot is the lottery corresponding to full information system, I. Thus by (i) we have
27that V (I) ￿ V (Q). Combining the two inequalities establishes the result.
Similarly, it is obvious that PGRU is necessary for ￿ being the least valuable informa-






. Let Q and pj be two
intermediate lotteries, where pj assigns probability p(sjj) to the outcome u(a;s), and the
compound lottery Q assigns probability ￿j(￿) to pj, that is , Q =
P
j2J￿j(￿)D￿u(a;s). By
de￿nition, V (pj) ￿ V (pj￿) for all j, and therefore, by monotonicity, V (Q) ￿ V (￿).
However, now Q is simply the folding back of the two-stage lottery, which when played
in one-shot is the lottery corresponding to ￿. Thus by (i) we have that V (￿) ￿ V (Q).
Combining the two inequalities establishes the result. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose not. Then there exist p;q 2 L1 and ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
V (￿Dp + (1 ￿ ￿)Dq) = V
￿

















= V (￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q)
where the weak inequality is implied by monotonicity. Contradiction.k
Proof of Lemma 3 (i): By monotonicity and continuity, there exists q = (q;(1 ￿ q)) 2
I((0;0)). By applying NCI twice, q = ￿q + (1 ￿ ￿)q ￿ ￿q + (1 ￿ ￿)(0;0) ￿ ￿ (0;0) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(0;0) = (0;0) for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Since q 2 I((0;0)), the result follows.




< ￿+ (q0). Take p 2 I((0;0)) and
look at the triangle with vertices (0;0); p; q0. Using the triangle proportional sides theo-
rem, for ￿ su¢ ciently close to 1 we have ￿q0+(1￿￿)(0;0) ￿ ￿q0+(1￿￿)p. Contradiction.k
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) There is no preference relation of the rank-dependent utility class that satis￿es PORU.27
Fix x3 > x2 > x1. By the RDU formula (page 15), the slope of indi⁄erence curves over ￿ is
given by
￿(p) =
g0 (p1)[u(x2) ￿ u(x1)]
g0 (1 ￿ p3)[u(x3) ￿ u(x2)]
:= c
g0 (p1)
g0 (1 ￿ p3)
Note that along the hypotenuse, H = f￿(1;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(0;1)j￿ 2 [0;1]g the slope is con-
stant and equal c. At (0;0), the slope is c
g0(0)
g0(1). By Lemma 3,
g0(0)
g0(1) = 1 and for all
￿;￿ < 1
1+c, ￿(￿;c￿) = c2


















27For simplicity we show the proof for the case that g is di⁄erentiable. Similar arguments apply to the




1+c + c￿;1 ￿ ￿
￿
implies that ￿(￿;￿) = c. Continue in this fashion, using Lemma 2
repeatedly, to show that for any lottery p 2 ￿ , ￿(p) = c. Therefore, g (p) = kp and since
g (1) = 1, we have k = 1 so g (p) = p and preferences are expected utility.
(ii) There is no preference relation of the quadratic utility class that satis￿es PORU.
Fix x3 > x2 > x1. By the quadratic utility formula, ￿(p) equals
p1 [’(x1;x2) ￿ ’(x1;x1)] + p3 [’(x2;x3) ￿ ’(x1;x3)] + (1 ￿ p1 ￿ p3)[’(x2;x2) ￿ ’(x1;x2)]
p1 [’(x1;x3) ￿ ’(x1;x2)] + p3 [’(x3;x3) ￿ ’(x2;x3)] + (1 ￿ p1 ￿ p3)[’(x2;x3) ￿ ’(x2;x2)]
Note that if ￿(m;1 ￿ m) = ￿(x;1 ￿ x) = k, then for all ￿ 2 [0;1],
￿(￿m + (1 ￿ ￿)x;￿(1 ￿ m) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ x)) = k
Lotteries p and q lie on the same expansion path if there is a common sub-gradient to
the indi⁄erence curves at p and q. Chew et al. [1991] show that for any quadratic utility,
all expansion paths are straight lines and perspective, that is, they have a common point
of intersection, which could be in￿nity if they are parallel lines. An implication of this
projective property is that for all m 2 (0;1) there exists either (i) x 2 (0;1) such that
￿+ (m;0) = ￿+ (0;x) or (ii) y 2 (0;1) such that ￿+ (m;0) = ￿(y;1 ￿ y).28 For case (i), let
￿￿
m;x 2 (0;1) solves ￿(m;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(0;x) 2 I((0;0)). By Lemmas 1 and 2,
￿













+ (0;x) 6 ￿
+ (0;0)
and similarly for case (ii). Therefore all indi⁄erence curves are linear and parallel, hence
preferences are expected utility. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
De￿ne fp (v) =
P
x2S(p) [u(x;v) ￿ v]px. Thus V (p) is the unique solution to fp (v) = 0.
Note that whenever p =
P
i ￿ipi we have fp (v) =
P
i ￿ifpi (v). Let P (p) := fQj￿(q) = pg.
Since fp (v) = 0 has a unique solution and for all x 2 (w;b), u(x;V (￿w)) > u(w;V (￿w)) and
u(b;V (￿b)) > u(x;V (￿b)), showing that V (p) > V (Q) 8Q2 P (p) is equivalent to showing
that fp(V (Q)) > 0 8Q2 P (p). To show the latter, we subtract from it 0 =
P
i ￿ifpi (V (pi)),
which does not change the expression, and regroup the terms as follows:
28The existence of either (i) or (ii) can be veri￿ed directly without relying on the projective property. The
details can be provided upon request.
29fp (V (Q)) =
X
















































































































































> 0 8p and 8Q2 P (p):
Proof: The ￿if￿part is obvious. For the ￿only if￿part, assume that for some j and for
some v 6= V (pj), u(c(pj);v) ￿
P
x2S(pj) u(x;v)pj





￿￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)￿c(pj)
￿￿
= v (by betweenness and continuity, such y and ￿ exist.) Let
Q = h￿;￿y;(1 ￿ ￿);pji (hence V (Q) = v). Finally , let p := ￿￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)pj. Note that
Q2 P (p). By construction we have













so V (p) < V (Q):k
Since p was arbitrary, we get the following necessary and su¢ cient condition for PORU:
C1 :
￿X
x2S(p) u(x;v)px ￿ u(c(p);v)
￿





30Claim 2: C1 i⁄ for every triple x3 > x2 > x1, the indi⁄erence curve through ￿x2 is the
steepest.
Proof: (only if): Fix x3 > x2 > x1. By continuity, for every such triple there exists a
p 2 (0;1) such that p￿x3 + (1 ￿ p)￿x1 ￿1 ￿x2. Therefore, the vertex (0;0) that represents the
lottery ￿x2 and the point (1 ￿ p;p) lie on the same indi⁄erence curve. This indi⁄erence set
is of the original preferences, and hence the value attached to it is V (p￿x3 + (1 ￿ p)￿x1) :=
V (p) = pu(x3;V (p))+(1 ￿ p)u(x1;V (p)) = u(x2;V (p)). By C1, for any other v, if we pass
through (1 ￿ p;p) the (arti￿cial) indi⁄erence curve corresponding to the value v, it must
lie weakly above the curve from the same collection that passes through (0;0). Since the
betweenness property implies that indi⁄erence curves are straight lines (so their slopes are
constant), the result follows.




x = vg in a (n ￿ 1)-dimensional unit simplex ￿(n). Assume further that
for some xv 2 (w;b) with xv = 2 S (p), h1;￿xvi2 Iv
29. By monotonicity and continuity,30 p can
be written as a convex combination ￿r + (1 ￿ ￿)w, for some ￿ 2 (0;1) and r;w 2 Iv with
jS (r)j = jS (w)j = n￿2. By the same argument, both r and w can be written, respectively,
as a convex combination of two other lotteries with size of support equal n ￿ 3 and that
belong to Iv. Continue in the same way to get an index set J and a collection of lotteries,
fqjgj2J, such that for all j 2 J, jS (qj)j = 2 and qj 2 Iv. Note that by monotonicity, if
y;z 2 S (qj) then either z > xv > y or y > xv > z. By construction, for some ￿1;:::;￿J
with ￿j > 0 and
P
j ￿j = 1,
P
j ￿jqj = p. Let V (q;v) :=
P
x qxu(x;v). By hypothesis,























Claim 3: NCI and C1 are equivalent.
Proof: see Proposition 1.
Note that by reversing the inequality in C1 and the weakly-prefer sign in NCI, we derive
the analogous conditions for PGRU. ￿
29The analysis would be the same, though with messier notations, even if jS(p)j = n, i.e., if x2 S(p).
30These two assumptions guarantee that no indi⁄erence set terminates in the relative interior of any
k 6 n ￿ 1 dimensional unit simplex.
31Proof of Proposition 5
Since for expected utility preferences NCI is always satis￿ed, it is enough to demonstrate
the result for lotteries with at most 3 prizes in their support.
For x 2 [w;b], denote by V (￿x) the unique solution of v = u(x;v). Without loss of
generality, set u(w;v) = 0 and u(b;v) = 1 for all v 2 [0;1]. Fix v 2 (0;1). By monotonicity




. Take any x > x(v) and





, the slope of the indi⁄erence curves on the
space f(pw;px)j pw;px ￿ 0; pw + px ￿ 1g, is continuous and di⁄erentiable as a function of v
on [0;V (￿x)].
Since v 2 (0;V (￿x)), Proposition 4 implies that ￿(V jx;x(v);w) is maximized at v = v.








Or,31 using v = u(x(v);v) and denote by ui the partial derivative of u with respect to
its ith argument,
u2 (x(v);v)[u(x;v) ￿ v] = [u2(x;v) ￿ u2 (x(v);v)]v (1)
Note that by continuity and monotonicity of u(x;v) in its ￿rst argument, for all x 2
(x(v);b) there exists p 2 (0;1) such that p￿w + (1 ￿ p)￿x ￿1 ￿x(v), or u(x;v)(1 ￿ p) =
u(x(v);v) = v. Therefore, and using again Proposition 4, (1) is an identity for x 2 (x(v);b),
so we can take the partial derivative of both sides with respect to x and maintain equality.
We get:
u2 (x(v);v)u1(x;v) = u21(x;v)v




v = l(v) independent of x, or by changing order of di⁄erentiation: @
@v [lnu1(x;v)] is
independent of x.















=) lnu1(x;v) = lnu1(x;0) +
R v
s=0l(s)ds




























is well de￿ned since by the assumption that all derivatives are continuous and bounded and











1 ￿ u2 (x(s);s)
u1 (x(s);s)
+ u21 (x(s);s)






is ￿nite as well.
To uncover u(x;v) on the region f(x;v)j v > u(x;v)g, ￿x again some v 2 (0;1) and
the corresponding x(v) 2 (w;b) (with v = u(x(v);v)). Take any x < x(v) and note





, the slope of the indi⁄erence curves on the space
f(px;pb)j px;pb ￿ 0; px + pb ￿ 1g, is continuous and di⁄erentiable as a function of v on
[V (￿x);b].









(u2 (x(v);v) ￿ u2 (x;v))[1 ￿ v] = ￿u2(x(v);v)[v ￿ u(x;v)] (2)
Using the same argumentation from the former case, (2) holds for all x 2 (w;x(v)), so
we can take the partial derivative of both sides with respect to x and maintain equality. We
get:
￿u21 (x;v)[1 ￿ v] = u1(x;v)u2(x(v);v)




[1￿v] = k (v) independent of x, or by changing order of di⁄erentiation:
@
@v [lnu1(x;v)] is independent of x.
Since v was arbitrary, we have the following di⁄erential equation on f(x;v)j v > u(x;v)g:
@
@v
[lnu1(x;v)] = k (v)
Its solution is given by
@
@v
[lnu1(x;v)] = k (v)
=) lnu1(x;1) ￿ lnu1(x;v) =
R 1
s=vk (s)ds
=) lnu1(x;v) = lnu1(x;1) ￿
R 1
s=vk (s)ds




































0 (s) + u21 (x(s);s)
= lim
s!1 u21 (x(s);s)
1 ￿ u2 (x(s);s)
u1 (x(s);s)
+ u21 (x(s);s)
is ￿nite, and hence the whole integral is ￿nite.
So far we have:





















We add the following restrictions:









= 1 ￿ v












Substituting into (3) to get:
u(x;v) ￿ v =
(
[u(x;0) ￿ u(x(v);0)] 1￿v
[1￿u(x(v);0)] x > x(v)
￿[u(x(v);1) ￿ u(x;1)] v
u(x(v);1) x < x(v)
(4)
We further require:
(iii) Continuity at x = x(v) . This is immediate since
lim
x!￿x(v)
(u(x;v) ￿ v) = lim
x!+x(v)
(u(x;v) ￿ v) = 0























u1(x;0) x > x(v)
￿
u11(x;1)
u1(x;1) x < x(v)















35which implies that for some a and b, u(x;1) = au(x;0) + b. But u(0;1) = u(0;0) = 0 and
u(1;1) = u(1;0) = 1, hence, by continuity, b = 0 and a = 1, or u(x;1) = u(x;0) := z (x) for
all x 2 [w;b]. Plug into (4) to get:
u(x;v) ￿ v =
(
[z (x) ￿ z (x(v))] 1￿v
[1￿z(x(v))] x > x(v)
￿[z (x(v)) ￿ z (x)] v
z(x(v)) x < x(v)
(6)













[1 ￿ z (x(v))]
:= m(v) (7)
Substituting (7) into (6) we have:
u(x;v) ￿ v = [z (x) ￿ z (x(v))]m(v) (8)
and using the boundary conditions, (i) and (ii), again we ￿nd that
u(w;v) ￿ v = 0 ￿ v = [0 ￿ z (x(v))]m(v)
or
v ￿ z (x(v))m(v) = 0 (9)
and
u(b;v) ￿ v = 1 ￿ v = [1 ￿ z (x(v))]m(v)
or
1 = m(v) + v ￿ z (x(v))m(v) = m(v) (10)
where the second equality is implied by (9). Therefore m(v) = 1 and using (7) and (8) we
have
u(x;v) = z (x)
which implies that the local utility function is independent of v, hence preferences are
expected utility. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6
We ￿rst show that the claim is true for any lotteries of the form p￿x + (1 ￿ p)￿y, with
36x > y.
Case 1, p = 0:5:
Construct the compound lottery Qn 2 P (0:5￿x + 0:5￿y) as follows:






















n!1V (Qn) = V (￿y) = ￿(y)
Proof of claim: We use the fact that Value of the lottery using recursive Gul preferences
and probability 0:5 for ￿success￿in each period is equal to the value of the lottery using
recursive expected utility and probability 0:5
1+￿0:5 for ￿success￿in each period.
Since z0










































case 2, p < 0:5:
Take Qn+1 = h2p;Qn;1 ￿ 2p;￿yi, with Qn as de￿ned above.
case 3, p > 0:5:









37Re-construct a lottery as above, but replace ￿y with QT1 in the terminal node. By the same
argument, there exists T2 and V
￿
QT1+T2￿
2 (￿(y);￿(y) + "). Note that the underlying
probability of y in QT1+T2 is 0:25. Therefore, by monotonicity, the construction works for
any p < 0:75. Repeat in the same fashion to show that the assertion is true for pk < 3+4k
4+4k,
k = 1;2;::, and note that pk ! 1.k
Now take any ￿nite lottery
Pm
j=1pj￿xj and order its prizes as x1 < x2 < ::: < xm. Repeat
the construction above for the binary lottery xm￿1;xm to make its value arbitrarily close to
￿(xm￿1). Then mix it appropriately with xm￿2 and repeat the argument above. Continue
in this fashion to get a multi-stage lottery over x2;:::;xm with a value arbitrarily close to
￿(x2). Conclude by mixing it with x1 and repeat the construction above. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7
Let 4V (￿ jp;n) :=grp(￿ jp;n), and for k = 2;3;:::;n ￿ 1, denote 4V (￿ jp;n) with
h(￿ jp;n) = n ￿ k by 4V (k) (￿ jp;n). It can be shown that
4V
(k) (￿ jp;n)


































The denominator of 4V (k) (￿ jp;n) is always positive, whereas the coe¢ cient np￿ (1 ￿ p) is











k￿1 pn￿k is simply the probability of n ￿ k successes in n ￿ 1
trials of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p. We then note that the nominator






















. Therefore, item (i) is implied.
Since ￿ = 0 implies expected utility, the ￿rst part of item (ii) is immediate. For the second
part of item (ii), observe that as ￿ increases, the value of the sequential lottery (V (Qn)) is
(smoothly) strictly decreasing and converges to 0, the value of the worst prize in its support.
The value of the one stage lottery (V (b p)) is a⁄ected in two ways when ￿ increases: First,
given a threshold h(￿ jp;n), the value is (smoothly) strictly decreasing with ￿. Second,
h(￿ jp;n) itself is a decreasing step-function of ￿. For ￿ large enough, all prizes but 0 are








To show the existence of ￿￿ (item (iii)), pick ￿0 > 0 such that grp(￿0 jp;n) = ￿ > 0.
Since lim
￿!1
grp(￿ jp;n) = 0, there exists ￿ := max
￿
￿
￿ ￿grp(￿ jp;n) = ￿
2
￿
and ￿ <1. Thus




, and hence achieves its
maximum on this domain. For single-peakness, we have the following two claims:
Claim 1: 8k = 2;3;:::;n￿1, 4V (k) (￿ jp;n) is either strictly increasing or single-peaked on
(0;1).
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pk (￿￿ + p￿ ￿ 1)
2
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B￿ (￿p + 1)
k + 1
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The roots of @
@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) are the roots of the second-degree polynomial in ￿ that
appears in the nominator.
Evaluated at ￿ = 0, this polynomial is equal to
￿

























n￿k (1 ￿ p)
k￿1
which is true as claimed before.
In addition, the slope of that polynomial at ￿ = 0 is equal to the coe¢ cient of ￿,

















To summarize, both the slope and the intercept of the polynomial in the nominator are
positive at ￿ = 0. Therefore, if C ￿ 0 then @
@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) has no positive roots, and
otherwise it has exactly one positive root.k
Note that 4V (￿ jp;n) is a continuous function that is not di⁄erentiable in the points
where h(￿ jp;n) changes. For k = 2;3;:::;n ￿ 1, let ￿k;k+1 be the value of ￿ where
h(￿ jp;n)decreases from (n ￿ k) to (n ￿ (k + 1)). Using the same notations as above, we




@￿4V (k) (￿ jp;n) > lim
￿!+￿k;k+1
@
@￿4V (k+1) (￿ jp;n)
Proof: Apart from at ￿ = 0, where 4V (k) (0jp;n) = 4V (k+1) (0jp;n) = 0, it can be
39shown that the two curves cross at exactly one more point, given by
￿k;k+1=
np ￿ (n ￿ k)
￿Pn￿(k+1)








Note that ￿k;k+1 > 0 i⁄ p > n￿k
n . To prove the claim it will be su¢ cient to show that
@
@￿4V (k) (0jp;n) < @
@￿4V (k+1) (0jp;n), since this implies that at ￿k;k+1, 4V (k+1) (￿ jp;n)
crosses 4V (k) (￿ jp;n) from above. Now:
@



































































To complete the proof we verify that both claims above are also valid for the two extreme
cases, k = 1 (where only the best prize, n is elation) and k = n (only the worst prize, 0 is
disappointment).
k = 1: Using the same notation as used above we have:
4V








2 ￿ + 1





(1) (￿ jp;n) = n(1 ￿ p)(p ￿ p
n)
(1 ￿ ppn)￿2 + 2￿ + 1
(￿￿ + pn￿ ￿ 1)
2 (￿￿ + p￿ ￿ 1)
2 > 0
for all ￿ ￿ 0 so 4V (1) (￿ jp;n) is strictly increasing with ￿ (claim 1).








(1) (0jp;n) () p >
n ￿ 1
n
so claim 2 follows as well.
40k = n:
4V
(n) (￿ jp;n) = np


























(n) (￿ jp;n) = Cnp
2 (p ￿ 1)
￿2 (1 ￿ p)
n+1 ￿ 1
(￿ (￿p + 1)
n + 1)
2 (￿￿ + p￿ ￿ 1)
2








(n￿1) (0jp;n) () p >
1
n
which is claim 2.
Combining claim 1 and claim 2 ensures that 4V (￿ jp;n)is single-peaked on (0;1). ￿
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